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A TEMPORARY DIVERSION ON THE ROAD
TO RACIAL DISASTER
Derrick A. Bell, Jr.*
Less than a month ago my long-time friend, Chief District
Judge Thelton Henderson, gave supporters of California's af-
firmative action programs a most welcome Christmas present. He
followed up the temporary restraining order he issued shortly after
Proposition 209' was approved by the voters with a preliminary
injunction, the appeal of which through the courts would seem to
frustrate the goals of this anti-affirmative action initiative for at
least two years.
2
Almost reflexively, I join the applause for Judge Henderson's
courageous decision. Jubilation by affirmative action supporters,
though, should be restrained. For, as I suggest in my title, the de-
cision, like the affirmative action programs it seeks to protect, may
prove only a temporary diversion on the road to racial disaster.
I want to lay a foundation on which to build this theme by ex-
pansion to the allegorical and by reference to the personal. First,
the allegorical: As I considered this talk, I kept thinking of my
t This article is the text of an address delivered at Loyola Law School on Janu-
ary 17, 1997. The transcript reproduced here has been edited for clarity. Source ci-
tations in the footnotes that follow have been provided by the Law Review staff to
assist the reader in further research.-Eds.
* Visiting Professor of Law, New York University.
1. Proposition 209, California Ballot Pamphlet, General Election Nov. 5, 1996
(enacted as CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31).
2. See Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480, 1491 (N.D. Cal.
1996).
3. Indeed, in April, a three judge panel of the Ninth Circuit vacated Judge
Henderson's decision. See Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, No. 97-15031, 1997
WL 160667 (9th Cir. Apr. 8, 1997).
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best-known story, The Space Traders.4 In the story, it is New
Year's Day in the year 2000. The boom years have ended. Tech-
nology has replaced millions of workers, and government at every
level is bereft of strong leadership and in very bad shape finan-
cially. Poverty is rampant, the environment is in a shambles, and
our natural resources are almost exhausted.
Suddenly, aliens from some distant world swoop down on the
United States, land their gigantic ships along the outer beaches of
Cape Cod, and make the nation an extraordinary offer: sufficient
stores of gold to pay off its debts, chemicals to cleanse its environ-
ment, and a safe nuclear engine and fuel to replace fast disappear-
ing fossil fuels. In return, the Space Traders want only one thing:
to take away to their world all African Americans. The response:
horror from virtually all blacks and some whites, barely restrained
glee from many whites, much ambivalence from everyone else.
After two weeks of furious debate, our national leaders, aware that
the trade could both save the country and insure its prosperity for
the next century, aware as well of the likely outcome when the
civil rights of a minority group are submitted to a popular vote, call
for a national referendum on the issue. The result: seventy per-
cent of the citizenry voted yes, and the trade went forward.
Dawn on the day of the trade presented an extraordinary
sight.
In the night, the Space Traders had drawn their strange
ships right up to the beaches and discharged their cargoes
of gold, minerals, and machinery, leaving vast empty
holds. Crowded on the beaches were the inductees, some
twenty million silent black men, women, and children, in-
cluding babes in arms. As the sun rose, the Space Traders
directed them, first, to strip off all but a single undergar-
ment; then, to line up; and finally, to enter those holds
which yawned in the morning light like Milton's
"darkness visible." The inductees looked fearfully behind
them. But, on the dunes above the beaches, guns at the
ready, stood U.S. guards. There was no escape, no alter-
native. Heads bowed, arms now linked by slender chains,
black people left the New World as their forebears had
4. DERRICK BELL, The Space Traders, in FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL:




The message in the Space Trader story is both simple and ir-
refutable: This society is always willing to sacrifice the rights of
black people to protect or further important economic or political
interests. Indeed, the history of racial segregation illustrates all
too well that the law and the nation only move to remedy racial
injustices when such remedies further interests of importance to
whites, or some of them.6 Again, that story and that message form
the backbone of my thinking about affirmative action and, of
course, about Proposition 209.
As to the personal: I want to say quite clearly that I am a
product of affirmative action. I am not stupid and I work hard and
would likely have had a worthwhile career without affirmative ac-
tion. But that career would almost certainly not have been as a
law teacher and legal writer. I absolutely would not have become
a full professor at the Harvard Law School. Without the Harvard
imprimatur, my unorthodox writings filled with allegory exploring
the depths of racism in the law and the society would likely not
have been published and, if published, would not have been taken
seriously.
Did I merit the opportunities affirmative action provided me?
Did my Harvard appointment deny some better qualified white
man the position I filled? Such questions, though hotly debated,
are totally disconnected from reality. Let's face it. The much-
extolled word "merit" has only a serendipitous connection with
making it. If we as a society truly valued merit, you would not
have the governor you have, we would not have the President we
have, and the make-up of our leadership in every area would be
far different-and certainly far better-than it is. Indeed, outside
the affirmative action debate, you virtually never hear the word.
We simply assume it while making decisions on an array of factors
in which ability is more a fortuity than a sought-for goal. In short,
the phony pennant of merit serves as the false banner of color-
blindness, used as justification for opposition to affirmative action.7
5. Id. at 194.
6. See MICHAEL LIND, THE NExT AMERICAN NATION, 139-41, 171-80 (1995);
Michael Skube, The Racial Dilemma Defining Americans, ATLANTA J. & CONST.,
Oct. 8, 1995, at L8.
7. See Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Tenth Chronicle: Merit and Affirmative Ac-
tion, 83 GEO. L.J. 1711 (1995); Judy B. Rosener, Standards of Meritocracy Don't Add
Up, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1997, at D4.
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I may have missed it, but if merit is really the concern, why
don't the various anti-affirmative action measures include legacy
admits? Studies show that those admitted to California's colleges
because a parent is an alum show credentials quite like those of
minority candidates! Actually, if merit were really a concern, we
would ban the use of SATs and other standardized tests. They all
predict performance to some degree, but they predict quite accu-
rately the socio-economic status of the parents of those taking the
tests.9 We maintain these so-called objective measures of aca-
demic potential because they identify and advantage those appli-
cants from the upper classes. When they don't, as when too many
Asians in California started out-performing too many whites, there
is serious discussion about altering the weight given in the admis-
sions process, for example reducing the value assigned to math
scores where many Asian-Americans excelled, while enhancing
the value of the reading scores where Asians did less well.
So much for merit. I think it was Christopher Jencks who su-
pervised a major study back in the late 1960s involving a massive
effort to ascertain the qualities that led individuals to enjoy success
in their jobs and careers. 0 The three qualities that turned up again
and again were not native intelligence, academic achievement, or
ability. Rather, what counted most were connections, family and
otherwise, personality, and luck.11 For me, affirmative action made
possible the connections, and luck made affirmative action popular
just when I needed it. For better or worse, affirmative action is
why I have been invited to speak to you this afternoon.
Now, you have my background as an individual who benefited
from affirmative action. We should, before returning to look at
Proposition 209, review the debate over affirmative action in his-
toric context. One hundred years ago last May, the Supreme
Court decided Plessy v. Ferguson,2 providing legal legitimacy to
8. See Ralph Frammolino et al., UCLA Eased Entry Rules for the Rich, Well-
Connected, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 21, 1996, at Al; see also LIND, supra note 6, at 165-71
(discussing racial preferences in connection with higher education legacy admis-
sions).
9. See David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Understanding Affirmative Action, 23
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 921, 965 (1996); Reagan Walker & Bill Rankin, State Uni-
versity Systems: Suit Seeks to Halt All Race-Based Decisions, ATLANTA J. & CONST.,
Mar. 4, 1997, at C3.
10. See CHRISTOPHER JENCKS ET AL., INEQUALITY: A REASSESSMENT OF THE
EFFECT OF FAMILY AND SCHOOLING IN AMERICA 8-14 (1972).
11. See id. at8.
12. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
[Vol. 30:1447
CALIFORNIA'S PROPOSITION 209
the widespread practice of racially segregating blacks in virtually
every aspect of public life. Mandatory segregation, the Court
ruled, was valid and, as for the protections guaranteed under the
Equal Protection Clause, the Court found it sufficient if the facili-
ties provided blacks were "equal, but separate."13
Writer Michael Skube in interpreting "separate but equal,"
the three-word phrase that baptized Jim Crow, 14 noted that,
[i]n a well-tuned English sentence, the ear expects to hear
the emphatic word or idea at the end. But in Plessy v.
Ferguson, it was separation, not equality, that the [C]ourt
was ensuring. There being no question about the black
man's lot in American life, the consequence of the
[C]ourt's ruling was that he be not only unequal but for-
ever separate.'
The Court, of course, had not set out on its own to repeal the
Civil War Amendments 6 and the supporting statutes enacted
during the brief Reconstruction period. Rather, the Court spoke
for the majority of whites who, whether pro- or anti-slavery, did
not consider, could not envision, blacks as other than an inferior
people whose labor was exploited, whose cultural contributions
were ridiculed and then stolen, and whose very presence provided
whites of vastly different positions on the social ladder with a
shared sense of superiority. 7  For the mass of European immi-
grants, the inculcation of a common racism was a major vehicle for
their acculturation and assimilation.
We should not be surprised that last year's centennial of the
Plessy v. Ferguson separate but equal decision was allowed to pass
almost unheralded by the major media. Predictably, most com-
13. Id. at 547; see id at 542-50.
14. Jim Crow is "[t]he systematic practice of discriminating against and suppress-
ing Black people." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 968 (3d ed. 1992).
15. Skube, supra note 6, at L8 (italics added). See also Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551
(discussing the implications of enforced separation). The Court stated:
If the two races are to meet upon terms of social equality, it must be the re-
sult of natural affinities, a mutual appreciation of each other's merits and a
voluntary consent of individuals.... "[T]his end can neither be accom-
plished nor promoted by laws which conflict with the general sentiment of
the community upon whom they are designed to operate."
Id. (citations omitted).
16. U.S. CONsT. amends. XIII, XIV, XV.
17. See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 560 (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also David Luban, Dif-
ference Made LegaL" The Court and Dr. King, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2152, 2189 (1989)
("Segregation laws, by giving whites a false sense of superiority and blacks a false
sense of inferiority, degrade human personality.").
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ments about the case were cushioned in reminders that fifty-eight
years later, in 1954, the Court in Brown v. Board of Education8
declared the separate but equal doctrine unconstitutional. 9
The Brown decision, though, was less the long-sought remedy
for racial segregation than a reinforcement of the two-part princi-
ple of this country's racial policies I cited at the outset-one that
encompasses affirmative action and is worth reiterating.
Part One: The society is always willing to sacrifice the rights
of black people in order to protect important economic or political
interests of whites. The Plessy v. Ferguson decision represents a
prime example of Part One, less because it gave segregation the
status of constitutional law than because it sacrificed black rights
in order to gain the support of whites for business-oriented eco-
nomic policies that harmed a great many white people.
Part Two: The law-and society-recognize the rights of
blacks and other people of color only when such recognition serves
some economic or political interests of greater importance to
whites. Lincoln's reluctant issuance of the Emancipation Procla-
mation20 to help the faltering effort to save the Union was an ex-
ample of Part Two in action. Similarly, after World War II, the
United States, now the world leader in efforts to win the allegiance
of mostly nonwhite, third-world nations, discovered that practicing
Jim Crow at home made it tough to advocate democracy abroad.1
The Brown decision, by promising to close the gap between
the country's ideals and its practices, provided an immediate boost
to America's foreign policy efforts.22 Here was Part Two of the
racial policy principle at work. But while the Jim Crow signs came
down after prolonged battles in the courts and on the streets, the
society quickly devised means to limit the substantive value of the
pro-civil rights decisions and the new civil rights laws enacted
18. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
19. See id. at 495.
20. ABRAHAM LINCOLN, THE EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION, 12 Stat. 1268-69
(1863), reprinted in DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 420-21 (Henry Steele
Commager ed., 1949).
21. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-
Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 524 (1980) [hereinafter Bell, Interest-
Convergence]. While America was trying to "win the hearts and minds of emerging
third world peoples[,] ... 'U.S. prestige and leadership ha[d] been damaged by the
fact of U.S. segregation."' Id. (citations omitted).
22. See Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN. L.
REv. 61, 113-20 (1988) (discussing the Cold War foreign policy aspects of the Brown




Disenchantment set in when whites began to recognize that
racial equality for blacks meant more than condemning the use of
fire hoses and police dogs on peacefully protesting children in a
deep-South town. It meant, as well, taking steps to correct for
decades when blacks were excluded, remedies that sometimes re-
quired whites to surrender their expectations of privileges and pri-
orities long available simply because they were white.
In the early 1970s, a great many corporations, government
agencies, and educational institutions decided that affirmative ac-
tion programs were a relatively inexpensive response to the urban
rebellions, particularly those sparked by Martin Luther King's as-
sassination. Without really altering patterns of hiring, admitting,
and promoting that privileged well-off or well-connected whites,
minority admission or hiring policies were designed to bring some
blacks, Hispanics, women-not too many you understand-into
previously all-white and mostly male domains.2' Some of these
programs worked better than others, and they all served the inter-
ests of the sponsoring institutions as much and usually more than
they did those previously excluded who were let in the door.
But as the job market tightened and anxiety about their future
well-being increased, more and more whites opposed these pro-
grams-whatever their effectiveness. 6 This opposition was en-
couraged by politicians at every level who were quite willing to
win elections by blaming the nation's malaise on affirmative action
programs. Given the nation's history of scapegoating serious eco-
nomic problems on blacks and other minority groups, it is not sur-
prising that polls reveal that a majority of whites, particularly
white men, are rather easily convinced that their well-being is
eroding, not because of policy decisions by corporate heads and
their elected representatives, but by blacks who, they believe, use
23. See GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 882-83 (12th ed. 1991).
24. See Derrick Bell, The Final Report: Harvard's Affirmative Action Allegory,
87 MICH. L. REV. 2382, 2399-2400 (1989).
25. See Norman Hill, Race in America: Through a Glass, Darkly, 7 PUB. PERSP.,
Feb.-Mar. 1996, at 1. Hill discusses hiring black women in executive positions as
"closing a 2 for 1 affirmative action gap (female and black) ... in what they perceive
... as a remaining bastion of white male supremacy." Id. at 2.
26. See Bell, Interest-Convergence, supra note 21, at 522-23; see also Note, Re-
thinking Weber: The Business Response to Affirmative Action, 102 HARV. L. REV.
658, 661 (1989) (discussing the change in business attitudes toward affirmative action
in the 1970s).
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racial discrimination as an ever-ready excuse for demanding pref-
erences while disdaining performance.27 As they did in the latter
part of the nineteenth century, Supreme Court decisions in the
area of civil rights in general and affirmative action in particular,
have swung into line with public opposition-so much so that strict
scrutiny has become useless to deal with continuing racial dis-
crimination and has become a tool for undoing modest efforts to
counteract that discrimination. As a former student, Radhika
Rao, described the Court's action in finding a Richmond, Virginia,
set-aside ordinance unconstitutional:
In City of Richmond v. Croson, a majority of the Supreme
Court chose for the first time to subject an affirmative ac-
tion plan enacted by the former capital of the Confeder-
acy to the stringent review it applies to the most repug-
nant forms of racism. The Court's decision to treat all
racial classifications identically possesses the same super-
ficial symmetry of the "separate but equal" analysis in
Plessy v. Ferguson, and it suffers from the same flaw. The
Court denies the reality of racism when it isolates race-
conscious actions from their context and concludes that
benign racial classifications warrant the same standard of
review as invidious acts.28
The obvious similarities of approach in an end-of-the-
nineteenth century decision, Plessy, when compared with an end-
of-the-twentieth century decision, Croson, sends a clear message
that we ignore at our peril. For today, a slender but seemingly
firm Supreme Court majority views programs to remedy long-
established patterns of discrimination as a greater evil than the
more subtle, but not less pernicious, patterns of racial bias that
continue to be practiced widely and without challenge. A color-
blind Constitution has become the battle cry for those on the
Court who, in the very face of its devastation, maintain that dis-
crimination is a thing of the past.29 The spirit of Plessy's separate
but equal standard is revived in the Court's willingness to employ
27. See Oppenheimer, supra note 9, at 947-53; Hill, supra note 25, at 1.
28. Derrick Bell et al., Racial Reflections: Dialogues in the Direction of Libera-
tion, 37 UCLA L. REV. 1037, 1040-41 (1990) (quoting Radhika Rao's reflections
written during a fall, 1989, Civil Rights at the Crossroads Seminar); see City of Rich-
mond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
29. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2117 (1995); see
also id. at 2118-19 (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that the government has no com-
pelling interest in compensating for past racial discrimination).
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disingenuous terms to disguise its continued willingness to sacrifice
black rights to further white interests.
As unnerving as its decisions is how closely the Court's racial
rhetoric mirrors that of its late-nineteenth century predecessors.
Justice O'Connor's opinions in particular contain the "see no evil"
approach of the Court in the Civil Rights Cases," where Justice
Bradley, ignoring the systematic persecution of blacks through
threats and violence including hundreds of lynchings each year,
struck down a series of federal acts enacted to protect black rights
and relied on a nonexistent reality to admonish:
When a man has emerged from slavery, and by the aid of
beneficent legislation has shaken off the inseparable con-
comitants of that state, there must be some stage in the
progress of his elevation when he takes the rank of a mere
citizen, and ceases to be the special favorite of the laws,
and when his rights as a citizen, or a man, are to be pro-
tected in the ordinary modes by which other men's rights
are protected.3'
Many of you are familiar with that quote. In the early years of
my career, it represented the thinking of a past era happily con-
signed to an inglorious judicial history. Its resurrection, in modem
but still scarily familiar guise, serves as bitter proof that legal ra-
tionales for the subordination of black people may lie dormant in
this country, but they never die.
It is Judge Henderson's failure to acknowledge these recurring
patterns of involuntary sacrifice of minority interests to allay or
deflect other concerns that gives his Proposition 209 opinion its cut
flower quality: beautiful to look at but of likely limited longevity.
Basically, his opinion finds that Proposition 209 violates the equal
protection guarantee because it restructures the political process in
a nonneutral manner.32 Specifically, it erects unique political hur-
dles only for those seeking legislation intended to benefit women
and minorities-who must now obtain a constitutional amendment
to achieve this goal-while allowing those seeking preferential
legislation on any other ground unimpeded access to the political
30. 109 U.S. 3 (1883); see also Adarand Constructors, Inc., 115 S. Ct. at 2117
(discussing the proper standard of review).
31. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 25.
32. See Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480, 1508 (N.D. Cal.
1996).
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process at all levels.33
In support, the opinion relies heavily on two precedents:
Hunter v. Erickson? and Washington v. Seattle School District.35 In
Hunter the Supreme Court struck down the results of a referen-
dum both repealing a fair housing ordinance and requiring a city-
wide vote for the adoption of any future such law. As Judge
Henderson saw it, the Supreme Court's analysis of section 137"7
turned on two particular features of the measure. First, section
137 raised equal protection concerns because it singled out an is-
sue of particular interest to racial minorities-racial discrimination
in housing. Had the measure imposed a new political burden on
all legislation, the Supreme Court was quick to point out, it would
not have run afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment." Second, sec-
tion 137 was suspect because it imposed a novel political burden
on all future efforts to enact fair housing legislation. 9 Had citizens
of Akron used the referendum process simply to repeal the fair
housing ordinance previously adopted by the Akron City Council,
this action alone would have raised no equal protection difficulty. 
4
Although Judge Henderson felt that neither of these two fea-
tures of section 137, standing alone, would have offended the
Fourteenth Amendment,4' the Supreme Court held that the con-
fluence of the two factors-the targeting of a racial issue and the
reordering of the political process-constituted a racial classifica-
tion that required the most exacting judicial scrutiny.42
Proposition 209, Henderson concludes, fails to meet constitu-
tional standards for the same reasons as the referenda in Hunter
and Seattle.43 State officials argued that these cases are distin-
guishable because Proposition 209 does not create, but specifically
bars, classifications based on race. 4 But Henderson said that onemust look beyond Proposition 209's neutral language and inquire
33. See id.
34. 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
35. 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
36. See Hunter, 393 U.S. at 392-93 (striking AKRON, OHIO, CITY CHARTER § 137
(1964)).
37. See Coalition for Econ. Equity, 946 F. Supp. at 1500.
38. See Hunter, 393 U.S. at 390-92; id. at 393-94 (Harlan, J., concurring).
39. See Coalition for Econ. Equity, 946 F. Supp. at 1500.
40. See Hunter, 393 U.S. at 390 n.5.
41. See Coalition for Econ. Equity, 946 F. Supp. at 1500.
42. See Hunter, 393 U.S. at 391-92.
43. See Coalition for Econ. Equity, 946 F. Supp. at 1509-10.
44. See id. at 1502.
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whether, "'in reality, the burden imposed by [the] arrangement
necessarily falls on the minority."' 4 He then makes a fairly de-
tailed survey of the Proposition 209 campaign and the issues in the
debate prior to its passage.46 Rather clearly, he concludes, the goal
as viewed by both sides was to eliminate affirmative action from
all state activities.47
For his part, Henderson, unlike the current Supreme Court
majority, refused to divorce the legal issue from the "raging con-
troversy" out of which it arose.4 Thus, while California insisted
that Hunter and Seattle burdened nonminorities and was unlike
Proposition 209 that outlaws preferences that inflict injury on
nonminorities, Henderson responded that Seattle and Hunter were
not cases about the limits on state-sponsored remedies for past dis-
crimination, but "are more appropriately understood as cases
about access to the political process."
4
1
Henderson's encompassing of' both history and the "real
world" is precisely what the Supreme Court majorities have not
done in recent racial cases-although it was the basis for striking
down the Colorado antigay and lesbian referendum in Romer v.
Evans 0 In the voting rights cases challenging the state's creation
of majority black districts to compensate for decades of gerryman-
dering and other devices to dilute the black vote, the Court has
regularly rejected the claim that the Voting Rights Act of 1965"'
and its amendments is a sufficiently compelling justification for
these districts. 2
In its most recent review of a set-aside case, Adarand Con-
structors, Inc. v. Pena,53 the Court ended any question that it would
apply the strict scrutiny test to all government classifications, even
if that placed in serious jeopardy efforts approved by earlier
Courts to correct for the long-time exclusion of minorities from
government construction contracts.54 In dissent, Justice Stevens
45. Id. (quoting Seattle Sch. Dist., 458 U.S. at 468).
46. See id. at 1493-98.
47. See id. at 1506.
48. See id. at 1503.
49. Id.
50. 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
51. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-
1973gg-10 (1994)).
52. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972) and the authorities cited
therein for a discussion of the voting rights cases.
53. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
54. See id. at 2113, 2118.
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wrote:
The Court's concept of "consistency" assumes that
there is no significant difference between a decision by
the majority to impose a special burden on the members
of a minority race and a decision by the majority to pro-
vide a benefit to certain members of that minority not-
withstanding its incidental burden on some members of
the majority. In my opinion that assumption is untenable.
There is no moral or constitutional equivalence between a
policy that is designed to perpetuate a caste system and
one that seeks to eradicate racial subordination. Invidi-
ous discrimination is an engine of oppression, subjugating
a disfavored group to enhance or maintain the power of
the majority. Remedial race-based preferences reflect the
opposite impulse: a desire to foster equality in society.
No sensible conception of the Government's constitu-
tional obligation to "govern impartially" should ignore
this distinction.5
Unhappily, this view is held by only a minority of the Court.
And under the "color-blind" rhetoric of the majority, whites are
treated as the discreet and insular minority and minorities and
their supporters must prove a compelling state interest to gain ap-
proval of remedial policies containing racial classifications. While
it is appropriate that courts balance harms to individuals against
the benefits of redistributive policies, the Supreme Court has gone
further. When the potential harm falls on an identifiable group of
whites, the Court transforms the expectations that whites devel-
oped under the existing system into a property right which always
defeats the entitlements of blacks.
In the process, strict scrutiny protection for "discrete and insu-
lar minorities" 56 is turned on its head.
First, blacks can no longer evoke the strict scrutiny shield in
the absence of proof of intentional discrimination-at which point
strict scrutiny is hardly needed.
Second, whites challenging racial remedies are entitled to
strict scrutiny automatically if the remedy has a racial classifica-
tion. Thus, for equal protection purposes, whites become the pro-
tected discrete and insular minority.
55. Id. at 2120 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
56. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
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There is no easy exit from this dilemma on the horizon. It is a
built-in barrier to all manner of social reform, including measures
having no direct bearing on race. It is a dilemma that Judge
Henderson handles by assuming that civil rights law and the Court
have not changed since 1969 or even 1982: that the Court and the
country are as supportive of civil rights and remedies as they were
then. It is this "back to the future" faith that may suffice if, as in
Hunter, Seattle, and yes, in Romer, a majority of the Court is un-
willing to affirm manifestations of bigotry openly displayed via the
referendum process.
Whatever the eventual outcome of the case, Judge Hender-
son's temporary ban on Proposition 209's enforcement provides
affirmative action advocates with breathing room to build support
for these programs. It will certainly not lessen the hostility many
whites feel toward minorities, immigrants, and the poor. Indeed,
this antagonism may grow with the frustration felt by many who
view Judge Henderson's decision as a judicial power-grab robbing
them of a victory achieved at the polls.
In many areas, the controversy over affirmative action has
likely led many managers to reduce their programs to little more
than the mention of it on their letterheads. The tightening of the
job market will hasten this trend whatever the final litigation out-
come on this issue. The same can be said of California's Proposi-
tion 187,' 7 intended to blame state policy failures on immigrants.
Political displacement of this character has, throughout the na-
tion's history, served as a convenient and comforting substitute for
the economic well-being and social status that most whites lack.
While so many whites ease their insecurities by fixating on the
supposed inadequacies of blacks, the corporate monopolizing of
the technological revolution is both creating an ever-widening
chasm in wealth, income, and opportunity and steadily eliminating
the jobs that are the cornerstone of the nation's stability.8
Sadly, the presence of affirmative action serves as a
smokescreen for the real causes of job anxiety. Indeed, were a
modest tax assessed on every employer who dishonestly told a re-
jected white applicant that he was not hired because the company
was obliged to look for a minority or a woman, the national debt
57. The Initiative Statute-Illegal Aliens-Public Services, Verification and Re-
porting, Cal. Prop. 187 § 1 (1994) (defining initiative's purposes).
58. See generally CHARLES A. REICH, OPPOSING THE SYSTEM 73-75 (1995)
(describing economic insecurity and social breakdown).
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could be substantially reduced, perhaps eliminated.
The growing reliance on automation, the deportation of jobs
to third-world countries, and the importation of cheap, foreign la-
bor, all have worsened the unemployment problem. Yet only out-
going Secretary of Labor Robert Reich was willing to point an ac-
cusatory finger at the nation's largest corporations whose downsiz-
ing tactics are ruining the lives of millions in order to retain or
even enhance profit levels." As a result, there are growing num-
bers of once-employed and now unemployed skilled workers, both
white collar and blue collar, executives, and professionals."
Job anxiety is now sufficiently severe that even the politicians
are having trouble blaming it all on affirmative action. Advocates
report that their inability to correct misimpressions was a major
factor in Proposition 209's passage.1 Your Republican governor
launched his presidential bid on a vehicle fueled by anti-
affirmative action rhetoric. 62 Significantly, he dropped out of the
race.63 Just as significantly, the Democratic National Committee
59. See Robert B. Reich, Prospective on Job Security: Government Can't Fix It
Alone, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 29, 1996, at B1; Allan Sloan, The New Buzzwords on Wall
Street: Job Cuts? What Job Cuts?, WASH. POST, Apr. 30, 1996, at D3; Richard W.
Stevenson, Bobbing and Weaving on Issue of Layoffs, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 1996, at
31.
60. This is not a temporary downturn. Advances in computer and communica-
tion technology have rendered much of their work superfluous, and the availability
of cheap and exploitable foreign labor has proven a temptation few company heads
seem able to resist. Even the largest companies now hire on a part-time basis or con-
tract work out as needed. These arrangements usually involve low pay, few benefits,
and no security. According to recent books, for example, LIND, THE NEXT
AMERICAN NATION, supra note 6; REICH, OPPOSING THE SYSTEM, supra note 58;
JEREMY RIFKIN, THE END OF WORK (1995), these conditions will worsen steadily in
the absence of strong correctives that neither government-and certainly not busi-
ness-seem willing even to discuss, much less undertake.
61. See Jerome Karabel & Lawrence Wallack, Proponents of Prop. 209 Misled
California Voters, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 5, 1996, at 19; George Skelton, An
Assembly That Acts Like a Parliament, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 7, 1995, at A3 (explaining
that getting the correct information to voters would be one of the opponents' main
challenges);. See also Sam Howe Verhovek, Texas Capital Ends Benefits for Partners,
N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 1994, at A8 (discussing a similar problem in the failure of Texas
Proposition 22 (1994) which would have provided benefits for employees' unmarried
partners).
62. California Governor Pete Wilson briefly ran for President in 1996. See
Cathleen Decker, Backers of Affirmative Action Face Tough Task, L.A. TIMES, Aug.
7, 1995, at A3; Ernie Sloan, Connerly: Man With a Mission, ORANGE COUNTY REG.,
Jan. 23, 1996, at A14.
63. See Cathleen Decker, Wilson Drops Out of White House Race, Blames Cash
Woes, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1995, at Al; Rick Orlov, Wilson Drops Out of '96 GOP
Field; L.A. DAILY NEws, Sept. 30, 1995, at N1.
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reportedly refused to commit any significant money to help fight
the measure.6 What this means is that anti-affirmative action
thinking is so deeply fixed in the minds of many that, while its
open advocacy is no longer a guarantee of election, the support of
affirmative action may be an invitation to defeat.
"Given all that you have been saying," you may ask, "how
would you have ruled were you in Judge Henderson's position?"
First, I admit that I might have ruled as he did for reasons
concerning the courts and their functioning unknown to me that
justify his action. But unless these factors were very strong, I
would write an opinion that indicated the relevance of earlier ref-
erendum cases like Hunter and Seattle. Reluctantly, I would then
express doubt as to their continued viability after the Court's re-
cent cases that make it easy for whites to challenge remedies for
racial injustice and make it almost impossible to design effective
remedies relying on racial classifications that, in the absence of
overt discrimination, can withstand the "strict scrutiny" test.
I would, in my opinion, as I have done in this speech, lament
the Supreme Court's retreat on civil rights in general and affirma-
tive action in particular. I would review in detail all the reasons
that affirmative action is an appropriate remedy for discriminatory
policies, both those of the past and those that are continuing, per-
haps citing to the report by Professor David Oppenheimer, and I
would survey the damage to minorities but more particularly to
whites if the state abandons affirmative action policies.
I would review the economic factors that led so many whites
and some minorities to support Proposition 209, and I would re-
view the history of such economic scapegoating. There is no deny-
ing that I would admit affirmative action has increased, point out
in detail how much more affirmative action has helped whites and
the society's image than it has minorities, and how, without it, the
losses blacks are experiencing at every turn will be increased with
adverse costs and consequences to everyone.
And having painted as bleak a picture of a future without af-
firmative action as I could, I would then deny the preliminary in-
junction and set the case for trial. Given my support for affirma-
tive action, my decision might disappoint my friends and delight
my enemies. I would expect to be denounced as the Ward Con-
64. See Michael A. Fletcher, Clinton Move to Center, Cabinet Changes Leave
Black Supporters Concerned, WASH. PosT, Nov. 15, 1996, at A10.
65. See OPPENHEIMER, supra note 9, at 958-96.
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nerly6 of academe. Alas, it would not be the first time. It hap-
pened to Martin Luther King, Jr., when he expanded his program
from civil rights to jobs and poverty and then to the Vietnam
War.67 I am not Dr. King but like him, I am willing to state the
conclusions that my experience have led me to reach.
In my experience, we who advocate social reform grant litiga-
tion a spotlight larger than anything judicial decisions can
achieve-particularly in the long term. Civil rights groups commit
an inordinate amount of their always limited resources to litigation
efforts, and lawyers-in the process-tend to usurp the stage from
grassroots political leaders. These leaders and their troops are es-
sential to minimizing the effects of an adverse decision and, para-
doxically enough, are even more important in the wake of a favor-
able judicial decision.
David Garth, the political guru, warned pro-choice advocates
in the wake of Roe v. Wade,6 "'The Supreme Court decision did
more than just legalize abortion,... [i]t neutralized you, it robbed
you of your rallying cry, your most provocative issue, your activist
identity."'69 Garth urged Planned Parenthood to become active
politically, a recommendation they rejected.7 1 The anti-abortion
forces, on the other hand, energized by the decision, did become
politically active and the results of their efforts are all too plain.
Judicial approval of affirmative action in its earlier years, as
ambivalent as it was, caused advocates to relax and rely on their
victories in court to translate automatically into acceptance in the
community. It didn't happen with abortion rights and it certainly
did not happen with affirmative action. What Garth is saying is
that victory in a social reform case leads to a passivity that un-
dermines the action that gives life to a cause and meaning to a be-
lief. We should strive to win in court but must view defeat as mo-
tivation for further struggle, not a signal to concede defeat.
Almost a year ago, the Fifth Circuit found the affirmative ac-
66. Ward Connerly spearheaded a national movement seeking to replace race-
based affirmative action with meritocracy in college admissions and government con-
tracting. See Rosener, supra note 7, at D4. See generally Amy Wallace, He's Either
Mr. Right or Mr. Wrong, L.A. TIMES MAO., Mar. 31, 1996, at 12 (providing a brief
biography of Connerly).
67. See David J. Garrow, Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Spirit of Leadership, in
WE SHALL OVERCOME 11, 25-27 (Peter J. Albert & Ronald Hoffman eds., 1990).
68. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
69. FAYE WATTLETON, LIFE ON THE LINE 209 (1996).
70. See id. at 208-10.
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tion program at the University of Texas unconstitutional. 7 The
program, withdrawn early in the litigation, used a dual admissions
technique specifically banned by the Supreme Court in the 1978
Bakke case. 2 Two members of the appeals panel went further and
questioned the continued validity of Bakke, finding that
"diversity" is not a compelling interest after all, that there are no
significant continuing effects of past discrimination at the Univer-
sity of Texas Law School, and threatened: "[I]f the law school
continues to operate a disguised or overt racial classification sys-
tem in the future, its actors could be subject to actual and punitive
damages. '
The Supreme Court declined review declaring that, because
the adjudicated plan was no longer in effect, it would be an inap-
propriate vehicle to review the continuing validity of affirmative
action programs in the admissions process.74 The Hopwood deci-
sion thus remained in effect in the Fifth Circuit, and several law
schools, including private ones, announced that they were shutting
down their affirmative action programs. Dean Barbara Bader
Aldave of the St. Mary's University Law School has refused to ac-
cept the decision. In speeches and writings widely distributed in
Texas, she has said:
I can promise you this: Unless and until my superiors
order me to stop, we at St. Mary's University School of
Law are going to ignore the Hopwood decision and ad-
here to the guidelines of Bakke. I am immensely proud
that 41 percent of the students in our first year class are
members of minority groups, and that our school now has
a higher percentage of Mexican-American students than
any other law school in the United States. At least as
long as I am the dean, St. Mary's University School of
Law will continue to turn out highly qualified lawyers,
judges, legislators and public servants, and they will con-
tinue to come from all of the diverse racial and ethnic
groups that make up our society.
... I hope that many of you will join me in according
to the Supreme Court the respect that it deserves, and in
spreading the good news that the Bakke decision is still
71. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 934 (5th Cir. 1996).
72. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,320 (1978).
73. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 959.
74. See Texas v. Hopwood, 116 S. Ct. 2581, 2582 (1996).
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the law of the land.75
Dean Aldave's stand is courageous. She, like Judge Hender-
son, retains a faith in her cause that is not diminished by a waver-
ing Court. One can be sure that whatever the outcome of the ju-
dicial decisions in Hopwood and on Proposition 209, their
commitment to the cause will carry them on. They understand
that life is a struggle and that commitment to that struggle brings a
sense of satisfaction that cannot be enhanced by victory and can-
not be diluted by defeat.
Here, then, is the challenge of Proposition 209 and all the
other dangers we who are minorities in power, money, and race
face during these turbulent times. We respond against overwhelm-
ing odds because we know that doing nothing will only worsen, not
improve, our condition. We rise and take risks with the knowledge
that, win or lose, we are on the side that we believe is right.
75. Barbara Bader Aldave, Hopwood v. Texas: Much Ado About Nothing?,
TEx. LAW., Nov. 11, 1996, at 43.
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